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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE . In 1942, the plaintiff’s predecessor in interest built a
fence on the boundary between the plaintiff’s property and the
defendant’s property. The purpose for the fence and the choice
of location, 11 feet onto the defendant’s property, was unclear;
however, the fence was maintained by the predecessors in
interest as a cattle fence when cattle were allowed to forage on
the crop stubble after harvest. The disputed strip was used with
the plaintiff’s property for crops continuously from 1942
through 1984. In 1993, the defendant had a survey done and
discovered the error in the location of the fence. The plaintiff
brought an action to quiet title, arguing that the plaintiff had
acquired title to the strip by adverse possession or by the fence
creating a practical boundary location. The trial court ruled that
title did not pass by adverse possession because the plaintiff
failed to show continuous, exclusive and hostile possession. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the planting of crops on
the disputed strip for over 40 years demonstrated sufficient
continuous use that was exclusive of any other party. The court
held that the exclusive and continuous use also demonstrated
that the plaintiff’s predecessors use of the strip in hostility to the
interests of all other parties. The defendant argued that the
family relationship, as cousins, between the plaintiff’s
predecessor in interest and the defendant’s predecessor in
interest demonstrated that the use of the disputed strip was
permissive. The court held that the mere familial relationship of
the parties did not raise any presumption of permissive use,
especially where the defendant’s predecessors made no attempt
to use the disputed land. The appellate court did not discuss the
issue of the fence as a practical boundary. Ebenhoh v.
Hodgman, 642 N.W.2d 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
CLEAN WATER ACT. In 1998, Missouri submitted to the
EPA a list of pollution-impaired waters in the state which did
not meet the state’s standards for water quality. The EPA added
several waters to the list and eventually approved the list for
remedial treatment. The plaintiff was a nonprofit corporation of
soybean farmers and sued the EPA because the list included
waters for which pollution was not adequately documented. The
Sierra Club had also filed suit against the EPA but for the
opposite reason, that the list failed to include several waters
which were polluted. The two suits were joined and the EPA
sought to dismiss the suit brought by the soybean farmer
organization as not ripe for adjudication because the
organization and its members were not affected by the EPA’s
action in a concrete way. The farmers had claimed that the list
harmed them through potential changes in land management
practices; limitations on crop growth; limitations on the sale and
use of fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides; and the inability to
rely on the use of certain waters. The court held that the
potential harms listed by the farmers could not occur until the
remediation plans were adopted, and because the plans were not
yet adopted, the actual harms could not be determined and the
suit was not ripe for adjudication. American Canoe Ass’n, Inc.
v. EPA, 289 F.3d 509 (8th Cir. 2002).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CONSERVATION. The FSA has issued proposed
regulations which would remove the regulations for the
Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP), replaced by the
Enviornmental Quality Incentives Program and would remove
the regulations for the Forestry Incentives Program, now
implemented by the NRCS. Existing ACP contracts would
continue, however, to be subject to the previously published
regulations. The proposed regulations amend the regulations for
the Emergency Conservation Program to allow cost-share
assistance for confined livestock for natural disasters other than
drought. 67 Fed. Reg. 49879 (Aug. 1, 2002).
SUGAR. The plaintiffs were several sugar cane growers’
organizations who sued the USDA for improper implementation
of the 2001 payment-in-kind program for sugar as authorized by
the Food Security Act of 1985. The USDA implemented the
pr gram through a press release without any notice and
comment and the plaintiffs argued that this was improper
because it did not comply with the Administrative Procedures
Act notice and comment requirements, the Food Security Act of
1985 because the USDA did not make specific findings, and the
Regulatory Flexibility Act because the USDA did not consider
the impact on small businesses.  The plaintiffs claimed two
injuries from these violations, the program gave a competitive
advantage to participants in providing sugar without production
costs and the PIK sugar depressed prices. The USDA countered
t at the sugar prices went up after the program was
implemented. The District Court held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing because they failed to show an injury-in-fact and failed
to show that the USDA would not have implemented the
program after notice and comment. On a motion for summary
judgment, the District Court did rule that the program
implementation was subject to the APA notice and comment
procedures but that the failure to follow these procedures was
harmless error. The appellate court reversed on all issues except
the violation of the APA. The appellate court noted that prices
had ris n during the program but also found that the plaintiffs
had provided evidence that the prices were lower than they
would have been without the program; therefore, the plaintiffs
had standing as parties injured by the program. The appellate
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court affirmed that the program was required to be implemented
through APA rulemaking procedures of notice and comment
and held that the failure to do so was not harmless because of
the indicated effect on sugar prices. The appellate court also
held that the failure of the USDA to make findings required by
the Food Security Act also made the program implementation
improper. The FSA 1985 required in general that the USDA
determine that the PIK program would not adversely effect
small and medium sized producers and would reduce the costs
to the federal government. The press release implementation did
not make these findings. Yet, the appellate court refused to
vacate the 2001 PIK program because the program had started
and producers and participants had relied on the program as
announced. Thus, the matter was merely remanded back to the
USDA for a remedy. Will that be one lump or two? Sugar Cane
Growers Co-op of Florida v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
TUBERCULOSIS . The APHIS has issued interim
regulations amending the regulations regarding payments made
in connection with animals and other property disposed of
because of bovine tuberculosis to provide that the APHIS will
make payments to owners of dairy cattle and other property
used in connection with a dairy business, and a dairy processing
plant in the area of El Paso, TX, provided the owners agree to
dispose of their herds, close their existing dairy operations, and
refrain from establishing new cattle breeding operations in the
area. 67 Fed. Reg. 48745 (July 26, 2002).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The IRS has issued
proposed regulations which amend the existing regulations
under I.R.C. §§ 170, 2055, and 2522 governing charitable
guaranteed annuity interests and unitrust interests to eliminate
the requirement that the charitable interest can not be preceded
in point of time by a noncharitable interest that is in the form of
a guaranteed annuity or unitrust interest. The proposed
regulations conform the regulations to the holding in Estate of
Boeshore v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 523 (1982), acq. in result, 1987-2
C.B. 1, which held that a charitable deduction was allowed for
unitrust and remainder interests passing to a charity where,
although the initial interests in the trusts were noncharitable, all
the nonremainder interests in the trust were unitrust interests. 67
Fed. Reg. 48070 (July 23, 2002), amending Treas. Reg. §§
1.170A-6, 20.2055-2, 25.2522(c)-3.
GIFTS. The IRS has issued proposed regulations relating to
the amount treated as a transfer under I.R.C. § 2519 when there
is a right to recover gift tax under I.R.C. § 2207A(b) and the
related gift tax consequences if the right to recover the gift tax is
not exercised. The proposed regulations would affect donee
spouses who make lifetime dispositions of all or part of a
qualifying income interest in qualified terminable interest
property. I.R.C. § 2207A(b) statutorily shifts the burden for
paying the gift tax imposed on a transfer under I.R.C. § 2519
from the onee spouse to the person receiving the transferred
property. The payment of gift tax by the person receiving the
property benefits the donee spouse because the donee spouse is
liable for the payment of this tax and, absent the right of
recovery, would be required to pay the tax from the donee
spouse's own assets. The proposed regulations will amend the
regulations under I.R.C. § 2519 to provide that the amount of
the transfer under I.R.C. § 2519 is reduced by the amount of the
gift tax that the donee spouse is entitled to recover under I.R.C.
§ 2207A(b). The amount of gift tax recoverable and the amount
o  the remainder interest treated as transferred under I.R.C. §
2519 ar  determined by using the interrelated computation
applicable to other transfers in which the transferee agrees to
pay the gift tax. See Rev. Rul. 81-23, 1981-2 C.B. 189. In
addition, the proposed regulations will amend the regulations
under I.R.C. § 2207A(b) to provide that if the donee spouse fails
to exercise the right to recover the gift tax, the donee spouse
makes a gift in the amount of the unrecovered gift tax to the
person from whom the recovery of gift tax could have been
obtained. 67 Fed. Reg. 47755 (July 22, 2002), amending
Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2207A-1, 25.2519-1.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
AUTOMOBILE EXPENSES . The taxpayer claimed
expenses associated with use of various vehicles in transporting
the taxpayer and farm equipment to a family farm. The taxpayer
did not keep written records of the purpose, time, date and cost
of the trips but attempted to provide oral evidence to support
receipts of the expenses. The Tax Court held that the travel
expenses would be disallowed for lack of substantiation because
the court found the oral evidence as to the time, date and
purpose of the expenses not credible. The appellate court
affirmed. Reynolds v. Comm’r, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
(7th Cir. 2002), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 2000-20.
CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT. The taxpayers owned an
apricot orchard and hired a third party to manage the orchard in
return for 70 percent of the crop. The orchard was damaged by
the misapplication of a pesticide and the manager attempted to
negotiate a settlement with the pesticide applicator. The
taxpayers disavowed any authority of the manager to negotiate a
settlement but the manager was able to obtain funds from the
pesticide applicator in 1999. The manager then passed on 30
percent of the proceeds to the taxpayers; however, on advice of
counsel, the taxpayers did not cash the check in order to
preserve their rights against the applicator. The taxpayers
co tinued to attempt to negotiate a higher settlement but
ev tually cashed the check in 2000, again on the advice of
counsel that litigation was too risky. The court held that the
settlement proceeds were taxable in 2000 because a substantial
limitation or restriction was placed on the money by the risk that
cashing the check in 1999 would have terminated the taxpayers’
rights to negotiate a larger settlement. Miller v Comm’r, T. C.
Summary Op. 2002-94.
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REORGANIZATIONS. The IRS has issued a revenue ruling
that applies the five-year active conduct of a trade or business
requirement of I.R.C. § 355(b) to a transaction involving a
corporation holding a membership interest in a member
managed limited liability company (LLC). The requirement is
satisfied when, immediately after the distribution of the newly
formed corporation's stock to the original corporation's
shareholders, each company is engaged in the active conduct of
a trade or business that is treated as having been actively
conducted throughout the five-year period ending on the date of
the distribution and that was not acquired during that period in a
transaction prohibited by I.R.C. § 355(b)(2)(C). However, if the
companies are engaged in such a trade or business both
immediately before and after the distribution, the requirement is
not satisfied. Rev. Rul. 2002-49, I.R.B. 2002-32.
DEPENDENTS. The taxpayer was divorced and the divorce
decree granted the taxpayer and spouse equal custody of their
four children. The evidence showed that, although the custody
was supposed to be equal, the children actually spent more time
at the spouse’s residence during the tax years involved in the
case. Because the children spent more time at the spouse’s
residence, the taxpayer was not entitled to claim them as
dependency exemptions, to file as head of household, and to
claim any earned income credit based on the children as
qualified children. McGee v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op.
2002-100.
The taxpayer was divorced and did not have custody of a
son. The taxpayer’s son’s principal place of residence was
Puerto Rico and the son lived with the taxpayer in the United
States for three months in 1998. The taxpayer had not filed
Form 8332, Release of Claim to Exemption for Child of
Divorced or Separated Parents, but filed a return as head of
household and claimed a dependency exemption and a child tax
credit for the son for 1998, claiming that the taxpayer provided
more than one-half of the support for the son in 1998. The court
held that the taxpayer could not file under the head of household
status and could not claim the dependency exemption or child
tax credit for the son in 1998. Ramos v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2002-179.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On July 3, 2002, the President
determined that certain areas in Montana were eligible for
assistance under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of severe storms and flooding
beginning on June 8, 2002. FEMA-1424-DR. On July 6, 2002,
the president determined that certain areas in The Territory of
Guam were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of
Typhoon Chata’an on July 5, 2002. FEMA-1426-DR. On July
19, 2002, the president determined that certain areas in
Wisconsin were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result
of severe storms and flooding on June 21, 2002. FEMA-1429-
DR. Accordingly, a taxpayer who sustained a loss attributable to
these disasters may deduct the loss on his or her 2001 federal
income tax return.
IRA . The taxpayer terminated employment and used the
distribution from the employee pension fund to open an IRA
with a bank. The taxpayer decided to move the money to a
higher interest account and withdrew the money from the IRA.
The taxpayer purchased two certificates of deposit, one for
himself and one for his wife; however, the CDs were not placed
in an IRA because the taxpayer failed to open an IRA with the
second bank. The taxpayer argued that the CDs should have
been treated as rollover distributions because the bank failed to
place them in an IRA. The court held that the taxpayer should
have been aware that no IRA was established for the CDs and
held that the CDs were a taxable distribution. The court
distinguished the case from W od v. Comm’r, 93 T.C. 114
(1989) where the taxpayer established an IRA but the brokerage
failed to deposit the funds in the IRA as directed by the
taxpayer. Anderson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-171.
The taxpayer had maintained an IRA for several years before
consulting with the custodian bank about changing the account.
The taxpayer closed the IRA account and the money was
transferred to an annuity which did not qualify for an IRA. The
taxpayer did not include the distribution from the IRA in
income, although the bank issued a Form 1099-R showing a
distribution. After the IRS began to investigate the distribution,
the taxpayer and bank sought to correct the problem by
reissuing the Form 1099-R and filing a “Traditional IRA
Withdrawal Statement” which directs the bank to distribute the
IRA funds to the trustee of the annuity. However, the taxpayer
took no steps to change the nonqualifying annuity into a form
which would qualify for an IRA. The court held that an error
similar to the one in Woods v. Comm’r, 93 T.C. 114 (1989) did
not occur to excuse the improper distribution because the
taxpayer failed to distribute the funds in a timely manner to a
qualified IRA. Crow v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-178.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING . The taxpayers owned an S
corporation which manufactured, sold and leased farm irrigation
equipment. The company provided financing to the buyers by
taking promissory notes as part of the purchase price. The
corporation reported the income from these sales on the
installment method. The taxpayers agreed that dealers are not
allowed the use of installment reporting of gain from the sale of
personal property in the course of business. However, the
taxpayers argued that the exception for farm property in I.R.C. §
453(l)(2)(A) applied to allow installment reporting because the
irrigation equipment was used in farming by the purchasers. The
court held that the exception applied only to farmers who sell
personal property used by both the buyer and seller in a farming
business; therefore, the taxpayer was not entitled by the
exception to use the installment method of reporting. The
appellate court has denied a petition for a rehearing, en banc.
Thom v. United States, 2002-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,529
(8th Cir. 2002), denying pet. for rehear’g, 2002-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,293 (8th Cir. 2002), aff’g, 134 F. Supp.2d
1093 (D. Neb. 2001).
The taxpayer, an LLC, sold three real estate properties for a
downpayment and installment note. The first sale occurred in
one year and the taxpayer’s accountant erroneously believed
that the sale was not eligible for installment reporting of the
gain and claimed all of the gain as income in the year of sale.
The taxpayer had discussions with the accounting firm about the
second sales to determine that they were eligible for installment
repor ing. However, the accountant who prepared the returns for
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those sales also included all the gain from those sales in income
for the year of sale. The taxpayer had the returns reviewed by
another accounting firm which discovered the error. The IRS
granted the taxpayer permission to revoke the election out of
installment reporting, although the IRS did not rule as to
whether the sales were eligible for installment reporting. Ltr.
Rul. 2002340016, April 18, 2002).
LEGAL FEES . The taxpayers purchased a hotel and
discovered that the seller may have misrepresented the income
history of the hotel. The taxpayers sued the seller for breach of
contract and misrepresentation. The parties eventually settled
for an amount which was felt to be the difference in fair market
value with the adjusted income figures. The taxpayers incurred
legal fees from the law suit and claimed a current  deduction for
those expenses. The IRS disallowed the current deduction and
argued that the legal fees were to be capitalized as part of the
cost of the determination of the purchase price. The court
looked at the main motivation of the taxpayers’ law suit and
held that it was to recover the amount overpaid for the hotel;
therefore, the legal fees had to be capitalized as incurred as part
of the acquisition of the hotel at the lower price. Winter v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-173.
OFFERS IN COMPROMISE . The IRS has adopted as final
regulations governing offers in compromise of income tax
owed. The regulations continue the traditional grounds for
compromise based on doubt as to liability or doubt as to
collectibility. In addition, to reflect the changes made in RRA
1998, the regulations allow a compromise where there is no
doubt as to liability or as to collectibility, but where either (1)
collection of the liability would create economic hardship, or (2)
exceptional circumstances exist such that collection of the
liability would be detrimental to voluntary compliance.
Compromise based on these hardship and equity bases may not,
however, be authorized if it would undermine compliance.
Although the regulations set forth the conditions that must be
satisfied to accept an offer to compromise liabilities arising
under the internal revenue laws, they do not prescribe the terms
or conditions that should be contained in such offers. Thus, the
amount to be paid and future compliance or other conditions
precedent to satisfaction of a liability for less than the full
amount due are matters left to the discretion of the Secretary.
The regulations also add provisions relating to the promulgation
of requirements for providing for basic living expenses,
evaluating offers from low income taxpayers, and reviewing
rejected offers, as required by RRA 1998. The regulations
provide for the development and publication of national and
local living allowances that permit taxpayers entering into offers
in compromise to have an adequate means to provide for their
basic living expenses. In accordance with I.R.C. §
7122(c)(3)(A), the regulations also require the development of
supplemental guidelines for the evaluation of offers from “low
income” taxpayers. 67 Fed. Reg. 48025 (July 23, 2002).
RETURNS. The IRS posted over 400 phone numbers for
local taxpayer assistance centers (TACs) on its website on July
24. The posting represents an expansion of the IRS's customer
service for taxpayers. The program, “Everyday Tax Solutions,”
allows taxpayers or their representatives to call a local number
to set up a personal appointment on any business day. The local
pho e numbers are dedicated to setting up face-to-face
appointments to help solve taxpayer problems.  According to the
web posting, the service addresses taxpayer problems such as
accoun and notice issues, installment agreements, release of
f deral tax liens and levies, and innocent spouse claims.  The
regular IRS help number, 1-800-829-1040, should be used for
telephone inquiries. The IRS also allows taxpayers and tax
professionals to submit general tax questions through a form on
its website.  As recently as May 2002, the Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) issued a report
indicating that a majority of these phone numbers had not been
published in local telephone books TIGTA faulted the IRS for
not having a system to monitor the publishing progress.  See
http://www.irs.gov.  CCH Taxday Aug. 1, 2002.
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ACCOUNTING METHOD. The taxpayer was the sole
shareholder of a cash basis S corporation which provided music
entertainment services for parties. The corporation often entered
into service contracts for events which would occur in later tax
years but received deposits on these contracts immediately. The
contracts had provisions for full and partial refunds of the
deposits but the corporation’s practice was to provide full
refunds to maintain good will. The taxpayer initially would
include the deposits in current income but, on the advice of an
accountant, started including the deposits in income for the year
the services were provided. The court held that change in the
timing of the reporting of the deposits in come was a change of
accounting method which required prior consent from the
Commissioner; therefore, the taxpayer was required to continue
reporting the deposits in current income. Morganstein v.
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2002-96.
SHAREHOLDER LOANS. The taxpayers owned several S
corporations which were part of their trucking business. The
corporations made a series of loans to the shareholders and the
other corporations and the taxpayers, in turn, loaned the money
to the S corporations. The court found that the loans were
without economic substance but were merely offsetting
bookkeeping entries since the loans were not repaid until the
IRS started to investigate the legitimacy of the loans and the
taxpayers’ increase of basis in their interests in the corporations.
The court held that the taxpayers’ loans to the corporations did
not increase their basis in the corporations because the loans
lacked economic substance. The taxpayers had also guaranteed
some of the corporations’ loans but the court also held that the
guarantees did not affect the basis for the same reason. Or n v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2002-172.
TAX-EXEMPT BONDS.  The IRS has issued a listing of the
proper population figures to be used when calculating the 2002
calendar-year limitation under I.R.C. § 142(k)(5) on the
aggregate face amount of the tax- exempt bonds by states and
other issuers of qualified public educational facility bonds
described in I.R.C. § 142(a)(13). The proper population figures
for calculating the volume limitation for calendar year 2002 are
the estimates of the resident population of the 50 states and the
District of Columbia released by the Bureau of the Census on
December 28, 2001. Notice 2002-56, I.R.B. 2002-31.
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SECURED TRANSACTIONS
ATTACHMENT. The plaintiff was a bank which loaned
money to the defendant. The defendant granted a security
interest in all cattle owned by the defendant at the time and all
after-acquired cattle. After the security was perfected, the
defendant’s father purchased cattle but had the cattle branded
with the defendant’s brand and kept the cattle under the
defendant’s care at the defendant’s ranch. The father also kept
other cattle at the defendant’s ranch but those cattle had the
father’s brand. The plaintiff sought to include those cattle as
part of the collateral for the loan. The father claimed that the
cattle were his and were not subject to the security interest. The
defendant and father were part of an Indian tribe and the tribal
court had ruled that the disputed cattle belonged to the father.
The father argued that the court should accept the tribal court
ruling under the doctrine of comity. The court held that the
tribal court ruling was not entitled to comity because the
plaintiff was not part of that proceeding and the proceeding did
not adjudicate the security interest issue. The court held that the
cattle were subject to the security interest because the defendant
had sufficient indicia of ownership in the cattle for the security
interest to attach. The court noted that the cattle had the
defendant’s brand, the defendant had possession and control
over the cattle, and the defendant made all decisions as to
culling, sale and care of the cattle. Firs  Nat’l Bank of Philip v.
Temple, 642 N.W.2d 197 (S.D. 2002).
FARM PROGRAM PAYMENTS . During the bankruptcy
case, the Chapter 12 debtor had granted a security interest in
crops and government agricultural program payments and
proceeds to secure an operating loan. The creditor had perfected
the security interest in May 1999. The plaintiff loaned operating
funds to the debtor in May 2000 and was also granted a security
interest in crops and government agricultural program payments
and proceeds to secure the operating loan. The plaintiff
perfected that security interest in June 2000. In October 2000,
the debtor received disaster relief assistance payments and the
plaintiff sought to have the other creditor’s security interest
declared secondary. Initially, the debtor argued that the disaster
payments were not bankruptcy estate property because the right
to the payments arose post-petition. The court followed In re
Lemos, 243 B.R. 96 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999) and held that the
disaster payments were the proceeds of crops and were estate
property subject to the security interests of both creditors. The
plaintiff sought priority for its security interest under the new
value provision of N.D. Cent. Code § 41-09-33(4). However,
the court held that provision did not apply because the collateral
here was not crops but the disaster payments and because the
other creditor’s note was due within six months of the planting
of crops secured by the plaintiff’s security interest. The plaintiff
also sought to use N.D. Cent. Code § 35-05-01.1 to unperfect
the creditor’s security interet in any crops other than the crop
next maturing after the security interest was perfected. Again,
the court held that the provision did not apply because the
collateral was disaster payments and not crops.  Farm ro
Services, Inc. v. Brown, 276 B.R. 620 (D. N.D. 2002).
PERFECTION . The debtor owned a farming business, a farm
equipment dealership and an accounting business. The
accounting business and equipment dealership were operated at
the same address. The debtors had granted security interests in
their farm personal property to two banks. The first bank
perfected its security interest first and the financing statement
described the collateral as “all inventory, chattel paper,
accounts, equipment and general intangibles.” However, the
financing statement listed the debtors’ address as the farm
equipment/accounting business address and not the address of
the farm. The second bank also perfected a security interest in
farm equipment and listed several specific pieces. The second
bank’s financing statement listed the debtors’ farm address. The
second bank argued that the first bank’s financing statement was
insufficient to perfect the security interest because the address
was wrong and the description of the collateral was too vague.
The court noted that the Revised Article 9 statute was
controlling in the case and held that the Revised Article 9
required only that the financing statement describe the collateral
sufficiently to put another creditor on notice that property may
be subject to a lien and that the other creditor should inquire
further as to the specific property covered. Since the collateral
description was so inclusive, the second bank was put on notice
that the debtors’ farm equipment could be covered by the first
bank’s security interest. The court also held that the use of the
business address was not fatal to the security interest because
the financing statement did not describe the collateral in terms
of its location, putting another creditor on notice that the
financing statement governed all such collateral wherever
located. In addition, the financing statement listed the debtors
personally and not their businesses, also indicating that the
collateral could include their farm equipment. This case clearly
demonstrates that the burden is on creditors to thoroughly
research beyond financing statements to precisely determine
which collateral is subject to a security interest. I  re
Grabowski, 277 B.R. 388 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2002).
CITATION UPDATES
Walshire v. United States, 288 F.3d 342 (8th Cir. 2002)
(disclaimers) see p. 89 supra.
IN THE NEWS
ANIMALS. The Nebraska Court of Appeals has ruled in a
livestock trespass case that Roberts v. Weber and Sonsand the
use of the res ipsa doctrine does not apply in a case involving a
standard barbed wire fence.  The court noted that cows can
escape such enclosures without the negligence of the owner, that
the fence was a legal fence in Nebraska, and that the fence was
different than the one at issue in Roberts.
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AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
September 24-27, 2002   Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and
understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and law instructors.
The seminar are held on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four
days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On
Wednesday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch
business planning. NEW THIS YEAR : On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover agricultural contracts. Your registration fee
includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The
seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small additional charge.
The seminar registration fees  for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or
Principles of Agricultural Law (and for multiple registrations from one firm) are $185 (one day), $360 (two days), $525 (three
days), and $670 (four days).  The registration fees for    nonsubsc ibers    are $200, $390, $570 and $720, respectively.
Registration brochures were mailed in June and July. However, complete information and a registration form are available
now on our web site at http://www.agrilawpress.com. For more information, call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-
mail to robert@agrilawpress.com
October 17-18, 2002  Spa Resort, Palm Springs, CA
“Farm & Ranch Income Tax” and “Farm & Ranch Estate and Business Planning.”
The seminars are held on Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one or both days, with separate pricing for each
combination. On Thursday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover farm
and ranch estate and business planning. The registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days
attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar.
The seminar registration fees  for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or
Principles of Agricultural Law (and for multiple registrations from one firm) are $185 (one day), $360 (two days).  The
registration fees for    n nsubscribers    are $200 and $390 respectively.
Registration brochures will be mailed in August. However, complete information and a registration form are available now
on our web site at http://www.agrilawpress.com. For more information, call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail to
robert@agrilawpress.com
*    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *
SUBSCRIPTION RATE INCREASE
The recent increase in postage rates and increased printing costs over the years have finally forced us to increase the annual
subscription rate for the print version of the Agricultural Law Digest to $110 per year.  This is the first price increase for the
Digest since it began in 1989. The new rates will take effect with the next billing date after July 1, 2002 for each subscriber.
Each billing offers subscribers the option to subscribe to our e-mail version of the Dig st which remains at $90 per year and
which is e-mailed on the Monday before the print version is published. You can beat the rush and change your subscription
now to the e-mail version and we will credit your account with an additional issue for each three print issues remaining on your
subscription. Send an e-mail to robert@agrilawpress.com for a free sample or to order the change in subscription.
